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"What turns people into turmoil are not the facts but their opinions on the 
facts": This is the claim of the stoic philosopher Epictetus about human misery. 
Epictetus equates misery with "turmoil" - that is, the absence of that peace of 
mind (ataraxia) in which he saw happiness (just as most other ancient schools of 
philosophy did, like the schools of Epicurus and the skeptic Pyrrho).
 The good news here is that for this very reason people have within their 
grasp the ability to achieve happiness. Since the facts, according to Epictetus, 
cannot be changed, but our attitude to the facts can. For example, the fact 
that we all must die is probably not so easy to change any time in near future. 
However, what we can change is our opinion that death were an evil: if this were 
not the case, death would have appeared as an evil even to Socrates, but it did 
not appear to him as such, as Epictetus argues.
 What may appear to us as a simple and obvious evil is in fact, if we 
follow Epictetus, something complex; something composed of a more or less 
indifferent set of facts on the one hand, and an addition we contributed on 
the other hand,  i. e. our way of 'framing' these facts; our way of positioning 
ourselves with regard to these facts.
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This composite character of what appears simple has also been captured by 
David Foster Wallace, in his beautiful speech, This Is Water. For instance when 
driving, Foster Wallace remarks, we may get terribly angry with some other 
driver who forces us to brake in a risky overtaking manoeuvre. Yet it is possible 
to overcome this seemingly obvious and legitimate turmoil: by imagining a 
different scenario – we can for example imagine, as Foster Wallace suggests, 
that the other driver has a dying child on the back seat which he desperately 
tries to bring as quickly as possible to the nearest hospital. 
 With this new imagination in place we have given the matter at hand a 
new framework that makes it, so to speak, appear in a different light. This re-
framing allows us to see that also previously we had been framing the matter 
– only back then, we used a sinister framework that led us into turmoil. The only 
difference is, that we were not aware of this previous framework. It occurred 
'naturally', all by itself – as natural as the water the fish swim in. Hence the title 
of Foster Wallace's speech: we, too, 'swim' in our anger, our envy, our jealousy, 
fear or anger, and so on, with the same apparent naturalness like fish in water. 
What we do not notice is the fact that, in contrast to the fish, it is us, who give 
the seemingly annoying matter the ‘fluid of annoyance’, in the first place. Our 
water is composed of the unnoticed additions to the factual matter at hand.
 From this, one could draw a first conclusion: the more different framings 
we are able to give a matter, the more we become aware of our own framing, 
and the more flexible we become. That is, the easier it becomes to switch 
between different framings. 
 For example, apart of our imagination of the father and the dying child, 
we could develop another one, for example, that the reckless driver were a 
disguised policeman who pursues a criminal (and depending on our attitude 
towards the police, we would then be either happy that we are protected, 
or swear that the damned cop puts our life at risk only in order to catch a 
thief). With every new imagination our agility and awareness would increase, 
and proportionately to this also our inability to decide for the ‘right’ framing. 
According to the sceptic philosopher Pyrrho, precisely this would be our 
happiness. Acknowledging the fact that our inability to decide for the 'proper' 
framing produces a superb balance in our mental life, we would, as ignorant 
sceptics, enjoy a wonderful peace of mind. "What do I know?" ("Que scay je?"), 
this is the question that the modern Pyrrhonist Michel de Montaigne took as 
his motto. And thus he did not boast about his ignorance of worldly facts, but 
rather enjoyed his indecision between different framings that appeared to him 
as equally possible framings for the facts at hand.
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An interesting question emerges at this point, namely, whether all orders are of 
the same kind, so that a single framing would necessarily, and always, appear 
like water, completely natural and insurmountable, whereas only with a second 
framing our ability to relativize the first would arise – a skill that would grow 
with each additional framing. Or whether there is a fundamental difference 
between the two types of framing, so that certain framings would necessarily 
lead us into ‘gloomy passions’ and into the corresponding affective immobility 
of obsession - whereas other framings, by principle, would not.  Given this, 
the latter framings, even if they were our only framings, would not put us into 
turmoil.
 The position of Freud and Lacan on this issue would be the latter: There 
are framings that convulse while there are others that do not. Only a certain 
type of framing is therefore for us like water - so to speak, the unnoticed fluid 
of our unfortunate passions, or our passionate misfortune  (according to the 
pun, commented by  Freud, "Eifersucht ist eine Leidenschaft, die mit Eifer sucht, 
was Leiden schafft."/ “Jealousy is a passion that zealously seeks what creates 
suffering"). 
 The imagination in the sense of Epictetus, i.e. our unnoticed addition to 
the facts,  would be for Freud and Lacan ultimately a very specific one - and 
always the same - namely, the imagination about the enjoyment of the Other. 
We can endure anything but one thing: that the Other had been exempted from 
that very frustration that we had to accept - for example, when we had to learn 
that mere wishing does not help. The Other becomes unbearable to us when it 
appears as if he had not had to accept this lesson of life; as if he had an entirely 
unproblematic life in a wishful world without the reality principle, as if he lived 
in a world of unrestrained enjoyment. This unrestrained, unproblematically 
enjoying Other is ultimately the only thing that brings our imagination into the 
state of producing a turmoil: for it is not just that the Other enjoys while we 
cannot; but rather, that we cannot enjoy precisely because he does. It becomes 
his fault that we cannot enjoy; he is the cause of our ‘castration’; he is the 'thief 
of our enjoyment.' All the misfortunes of this world touch us only ‘more or 
less’; yet the absolute evil emerges when we elevate sad facts, by means of our 
imagination, to the dignity of our castration. 
(This would be the negative counterpart to Lacan's formula of sublimation as 
the "elevation of the object to the dignity of the Thing". Further, it would be the 
opposite process to that described by Freud as the goal of the psychoanalytic 
treatment: the transformation of "hysterical misery" into "normal misfortune".)
 Thus, we would have won two different figures of exit from the order 
of "water" : a non-directional, pluralistic, and directional, dualistic one. We 
might well say, without major exaggeration, that the first figure is the typical 
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postmodern figure, while the second figure is characteristic of modernity. From 
the perspective of the first, postmodern figure, the second, modern one would 
still harbour distinctly damp patches of undried passions. For modernity still 
believes in the superiority of one idea, or one framing, over the other. Yet it is 
precisely this idea of the superiority of one idea over another which creates 
turmoil, according to the postmodern viewpoint. This idea of superiority would 
have to be dissolved in order to allow for happy indifference. Only when all 
ideas have equally fallen into indifference and meaninglessness, peace would 
prevail, and tranquility of our soul arise.
 However, from the perspective of the second, modern figure, it is precisely 
this idea which has to be regarded as the non-dried water-remainder of the first, 
post-modern figure: Nothing must mean anything; nothing is allowed to be more 
true than something else - otherwise truth would emerge as the thief of the 
enjoyment of all others. But who says, on the other hand, that truth is so hard to 
bear? Is truth an instance of enjoyment, something absolute - as it is understood 
by those religions who believe to possess an absolute, transcendent truth, and 
therefore difficult to access? 
 Is truth not rather, as the sciences teach us every day, something that is 
completely immanent, profane, secular, transitory, easily available and easily 
surpassable, just as smartphones or coffee machines that are surpassed almost 
every day by a newer, better smartphone or by a newer, hipper coffee machine? 
Is truth therefore not something entirely common, thoroughly castrated? So 
what would be so bad about being surpassed by something true? Why should 
we feel deprived of enjoyment and unable to congratulate the lucky winner, 
fairly, as good sports? For modernism, postmodernism would be a neurotic who 
can bear no truth, because he is a sore loser.
 With these two figures in mind, I start observing myself and cannot 
conceal from myself a certain feeling of happiness and intellectual freedom. I 
vacillate between these two figures and hesitate to decide for one. And just 
in this indecision, this hesitation, I would, according to Epictetus and Pyrrho, 
experience tremendous happiness: so to speak, the ultimate peace of the 
peaces of mind, the ataraxia of the ataraxias. What particularly pleases me is 
the fact that I cannot define the pattern according to which I actually vacillate 
when vacillating between these two patterns. I can not tell whether I feel so 
free because I have gained mobility between two ideas that are, by this very 
fact of my mobility, equally devalued and no longer able to impress me; or if 
I rather became able to shake off a bad idea, thanks to another idea, which is 
true and thus not unsettling or threatening. I vacillate between these two types 
of vacillation and thoroughly enjoy the fact that I am not able to reveal even to 
myself to which of these two types my vacillation belongs.
